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TENDER OFFER DEVELOPMENTS IN 1980
A. SEC v. Texas International Co.
The popularity of tender offers as a means of corporate acquisition1
has resulted in judicial and legislative definition of tender offers.2
Generally, a tender offer consists of a public invitation by one company
to purchase a fixed amount of another ompany's stock at a premium
price.' Since a company makes an offer as part of a takeover attempt, the
offeror may condition its obligation to purchase shares upon a sufficient
number of shares being tendered.4 In addition, the offer is usually
available for only a limited period of time.' Prior to Congress' enactment
of the Williams Act (Act)," target shareholders were pressured into mak-
ing hasty and uninformed decisions because the offeror had no obligation
to disclose its methods or intentions.7 Congress promulgated the
Williams Act as an amendment to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
' See Austin, Tender Offer Update: 1978-1979, 15 MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS 13, 23-24
(1980). Over 80% of all takeover attempts by tender offer are successful. Id. at 23. In 1979,
there were as many as 114 tender offers despite increased economic uncertainty and strong
defense tactics by targets. Id. at 13 n.1 & 23. In the mid-1970's, tender offers averaged 160
per year. See id. at 13.
2 Courts have defined tender offers expansively by examining the substance rather
than the form of unconventional transactions. In Cattlemen's Investment Co. v. Fears, 343
F. Supp. 1248 (W.D. Okla. 1972), a federal district court held that a widespread but private
solicitation of a corporation's shares was a tender offer, notwithstanding that shareholders
are solicited publicly in conventional tender offers. Id. at 1251-52; see text accompanying
note 3 infra. In Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 584 F.2d 1195 (2d Cir.
1978), however, the court refused to find a tender offer because the transaction was not suf-
ficiently similar to a conventional tender offer. Id. at 1206. While courts have been for-
mulating various tender offer definitions, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
has proposed its own tender offer definition. See 44 Fed. Reg. 70,349 (Dec. 6, 1979). The SEC
proposed a two-tiered test for defining a tender offer. SEC Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 34-16385 (Nov. 29, 1979), reprinted in [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 82,374, at 82,603. The first tier defines a tender offer as an invitation directed
to more than ten shareholders to acquire more than 5% of a security class within 45 days.
Id. The second tier defines a tender offer as a public invitation to purchase stock at a
premium price without negotiation on price or terms. Id. at 82,604-05. If an acquisition plan
conforms to either definition, the substantive and disclosure provisions of the Williams Act
apply. Id. at 82,603.
1 See Note, The Developing Meaning of "Tender Offer" Under the Securities Ex-




15 U.S.C. 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1976 & Supp. III 1979), amending Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 ('34 Act), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
7 See H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 2811, 2813; Note, Defining Tender Offers: Resolving a Decade of Dilemma, 54
ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 520, 520-21 & n.4-6 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Decade of Dilemma].
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('34 Act) to alleviate these shareholder pressures and to aid shareholders
in making an informed decision.' Section 14(d) of the Act requires tender
offerors to file certain information with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC).' The filing requirements of section 14(d) apply only to
tender offers for equity securities that are registered under section 12(g)
of the '34 Act."0 The fraud prohibitions of section 14(e) apply to all
misrepresentations in connection with the tender offer." These anti-
fraud provisions attempt to ensure that target shareholders have com-
plete and accurate information when making a decision on an offer.2
Despite the purpose of the Act to provide adequate information to
target shareholders,"3 the SEC has not promulgated a definition of
tender offers. 4 Until the SEC adopts a comprehensive definition, judicial
' 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976 & Supp. III 1979); see H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong. 2d
Sess. 2, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2811, 2811-13. In Piper v. Chris-
Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977), the Supreme Court concluded that the purpose of the
Williams Act is to provide adequate information to shareholders confronted by a tender of-
fer. Id. at 35.
' 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1976). Pursuant to § 14(d) of the '34 Act offerors must file with the
SEC copies of the tender offer invitation and any other information the Commission may re-
quire. Id.
1" Id. Section 14(d) requires an offeror to file only if consummation of the tender offer
would give the offeror beneficial ownership of more than 5% of a class of equity securities.
Id.
11 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976). Section 14(e) of the '34 Act prohibits fraud, deception and
material misrepresentations in connection with a tender offer. Id.; see Lewis discussion part
B infra. Pursuant to § 14(e), the SEC has promulgated two rules directed at preventing
fraud in connection with a tender offer. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-1, -2 (1980). Rule 14e-1 im-
poses timing and disclosure requirements on offerors. Id. § 240.14e-1 (1980); see McDermott
discussion part C infra. Rule 14e-2 requires target companies to inform shareholders of its
evaluation of prospective tender offers. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-1 (1980).
12 See 44 Fed. Reg. 70,348 (Dec. 6, 1979).
IS See note 8 supra.
" For over a decade, the SEC left the responsibility for definition of tender offers with
the courts, theorizing that courts would then have greater flexibility in applying the SEC's
tender offer regulations to the varied methods of corporate acquisition. See SEC Securities
Exchange Act Release No.34-12676 (August 2, 1976), reprinted in [1975-1977 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 80,659, at 86,895-96. The SEC specifically declined to pro-
pose a tender offer definition by reasoning that the dynamic nature of stock acquisition
transactions renders a definition inappropriate and unnecessary. Id. Lacking regulatory
guidance, courts constructed tender offer definitions on a case-by-case basis. See, e.g.,
Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 596-98 (5th Cir. 1974); Wellman v. Dickinson,
475 F. Supp. 783, 826 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (secret acquisition of stock from 39 solicitees at large
premium is tender offer); S-G Securities, Inc. v. Fuqua Inv. Co., 466 F. Supp. 1114, 1126-27
(D. Mass. 1978) (public announcement of intention to gain control through stock acquisition
with subsequent rapid acquisition of large block constitutes tender offer); Cattlemen's Inv.
Co. v. Fears, 343 F. Supp. 1248, 1252 (W.D. Okla. 1972), vacated per stipulation, No. 72-152
(W.D. Okla. May 8, 1972) (solicitation of stock through telephone calls, letters, and visits is
tender offer); see Decade of Dilemma, supra note 7, at 522. The court's varied definitions,
however resulted in such an excessive degree of diversity that the SEC recently proposed
its own tender offer definition. See 44 Fed. Reg. 70,349 (Dec. 6, 1979) (proposed rule
14d-1(b)(1); Note, What is a Tender Offer?, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 906, 906 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Tender Offer]; note 2 supra.
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attempts at definition of tender offers will determine the scope of the
Williams Act.' 5
In SEC v. Texas International Co.,16 a federal district court recently
extended the scope of the Williams Act by holding that an offer to pur-
chase creditors' claims in bankruptcy that are convertilile to securities is
a tender offer subject to the Williams Act. 7 King Resources Corporation
(KRC), an involuntarily bankrupt company, structured a corporate
reorganization plan that would allow its business to continue relatively
debt-free as the new Phoenix Resources Company. 8 KRC would dis-
charge over ninety percent of its debts by issuing stock in the new com-
pany, Phoenix, to KRC's creditors. 9 After KRC's shareholders approved
the reorganization plan, Texas International Company (TI) decided to ac-
quire Phoenix by purchasing the claims of certain KRC creditors."
TI's offer contained several characteristics of conventional tender
offers.2 TI made a public invitation to purchase claims of over 20,000
solicitees.' Additionally, the offer contained a two-week time limit that
could pressure the solicitees into making a hasty decision.' TI provided
the targeted creditors with information on the terms of the offers and
also disclosed its objective to gain control of KRC-Phoenix. 4 As a result
of its offer, TI acquired claims equivalent to slightly less than a majority
ownership of KRC-Phoenix.u The SEC subsequently filed suit for injunc-
tive relief against TI and alleged that TI's bid for KRC's creditors'
claims was a tender offer and, therefore, that TI violated section 14(d) of
the Williams Act by not filing a disclosure report to the SEC about its
acquisition of KRC-Phoenix.'8 The SEC also alleged that some of TI's
1" See Note, Expansion of the Williams Act: Tender Offer Regulation for Non-
conventional Purchases, 11 Loy. U. (CHI.) L. J. 277, 281 (1980).
18 498 F. Supp. 1231 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
1 Id. at 1240.
Id. at 1236. See generally Mitchell, Securities Regulation in Bankruptcy
Reorganizations, 54 BANKR. L. J. 101 (1980).
19 498 F. Supp. at 1236. King Resources Corporation (KRC) paid in full the claims that
were not discharged by the issuance of new stock. Id. KRC's trustee in bankruptcy divided
the new stock into two classes and issued the shares according to the creditors' priorities.
Id. at 1237. One group of shareholders, referred to as the Dietrich class, obtained unsecured
creditor status by settling a class action lawsuit in which they charged KRC with fraudulent
securities transactions. Id. The Dietrich class was instrumental to the fraud claims in the in-
stant case because they were shareholders at the time of TI's alleged misrepresentations.
Id. at 1238; see text accompanying notes 42-48 infra.
" 498 F. Supp. at 1237. The court commented that Texas International was
"acquisition-minded" in the field of oil and gas exploration and production. Id.
" See id. at 1240; text accompanying notes 3-5 supra.
" 498 F. Supp. at 1240. The court stated that because TI's offer was directed to over
20,000 solicitees, the offer had a widespread impact on the investing public. Id.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 1237.
Id. at 1238. Although TI's purchased claims amounted to less than one-third of
KRC's total claims, those purchases converted into 44% of Phoenix stock. Id.; see id. at n.1.
I Id. at 1238. In order to invoke the tender offer disclosure requirements of § 14(d), the
SEC had to prove that the claims of KRC's creditors amounted to equity securities under §
1981] 1001
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materials contained material misrepresentations in violation of section
14(e) of the Williams Act.1
7
To determine whether section 14(d) applied to TI, the court con-
sidered whether TI made a tender offer for a class of equity securities
registered under section 12(g) of the '34 Act. 8 The district court held
that in light of the purposes of the Williams Act, TI's bid constituted a
tender offer.29 The court reasoned that TI's bid possessed many of the
characteristics of conventional tender offers, and that the bid presented
the potential problems that the Williams Act was designed to prevent."
The court next found that TI's offer was for an equity security because
TI purchased creditors' claims that were readily exchangeable into
Phoenix equity securities." Reasoning that substance and not form
should control, the court held that the creditors' claims, although not
securities themselves, were so closely related to the Phoenix stock that
TI's offer was made for equity securities.2
The final consideration under section 14(d) was whether TI's offer
concerned securities that were registered under section 12(g) of the '34
Act.3 Although the targeted Phoenix stock was not registered during
12(g) of the '34 Act. Id. Equity securities are defined as any stock or similar security that
reflects an interest in a corporation. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(11) (1976). The SEC claimed that
§ 12(g) should apply to TI's offer because the claims were readily exchangeable into shares
of Phoenix stock. 498 F. Supp. at 1238; see text accompanying notes 28-32 infra.
1 498 F. Supp. at 1238; see 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b) & 78n(e) (1976); 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.10b-5 &
14(e) (1980).
498 F. Supp. at 1238; see text accompanying notes 9 & 10 supra.
498 F. Supp. at 1240.
Id. The tender offer characteristics that TI's bid possessed included a public invita-
tion, a limited period of time for target shareholders to respond, an offer to over 20,000
solicitees, and an overt intention to gain control through the purchase. Id.; see text accom-
panying notes 3-5, 21-23 supra. The court concluded that the large number of solicitees and
the two-week time limit placed pressure on the shareholders. Id.; see text accompanying
notes 22 & 23 supra.
1, 498 F. Supp. at 1240-41; see note 26 supra. In finding that TI's offer was for equity
securities, the court emphasized that consummation of the reorganization plan was quite
probable and, therefore, that TI was contemplating receiving Phoenix stock, not merely
creditors' claims. Id.
32 Id.; see note 31 supra. The Texas International court supported its broad use of the
term "equity security" by relying on SEC v. Howey, 328 U.S. 293 (1946). In Howey, the
Supreme Court held that definitions under the securities laws are based on flexible, not nar-
row principles. Id. at 299. In Texas International, the court also reasoned that the practical
economic reality was that TI purchased equity securities. 498 F. Supp. at 1241.
1 Id. Section 12(g) of the '34 Act requires issuers to file a registration statement with
the SEC if the issuer deals in interstate commerce, has assets exceeding $1,000,000 and has a
class of equity securities held by more than 500 persons. 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(1)(B) (1976). KRC
was registered under § 12(g) until bankruptcy proceedings began. 498 F. Supp. at 1241. Due
to the bankruptcy proceedings and filings required thereunder, Phoenix was exempt from
the registration requirements until trading in Phoenix shares began. See id. at 1242. Once
trading began, however, Phoenix had all the characterisitcs that require registration under
§ 12(g). Id. TI's tender offer occurred before § 12(g) applied to the Phoenix shares. Id.
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the offer, KRC stock was registered until the reorganization plan went
into effect. 4 The court acknowledged that the Phoenix stock could not be
deemed continuously registered through its contention to KRC because
the Phoenix stock arose from creditor's claims, not from KRC stock. 5
Reasoning that Phoenix Stock had the characteristics of securities sub-
ject to section 12(g), however, the court concluded that Phoenix stock
should be considered registered in order to comport with the protective
purposes of the '34 Act." In addition, the court found support for its deci-
sion in rule 12g-3(a) of the '34 Act, which creates a continuity of registra-
tion for securities issued by companies undergoing fundamental busi-
ness changes." Conceding that KRC's reorganization was not a merger
or an exchange of assets to which rule 12g-3(a) refers, the court nonethe-
less concluded that the rule applied to KRC because KRC was indeed
undergoing a fundamental business change. 8 The court reasoned that to
deny the rule's application to KRC would subvert the protective pur-
poses of the '34 Act.39 Since TI's bid constituted a tender offer for equity
securities registered under section 12(g), the court found that section
14(d) applied to TI's offer to KRC creditors.40 Accordingly, the court held
that TI violated section 14(d) by not filing the appropriate materials with
the SEC as required.
41
Regarding the SEC's section 14(e) charge that TI's offer contained
material misrepresentations, the court determined that the allegation
was sufficiently m4terial to survive TI's motion for summary judgment.42
TI contended, however, that in addition to materiality, the SEC must
establish that TI's misrepresentations were made with scienter.41 TI
I Id. at 1341-42. See note 33 supra.
498 F. Supp. at 1243.
Id. The court reasoned that Congress added § 12(g) to the '34 Act in order to extend
the Act's disclosure obligations to a wider class of securities. Id.; see 109 CONG. REC.
13725-26 (1963); 10 CONG. REC. 17916, 17921 (1964). Phoenix was not registered during TI's
offer because of the bankruptcy proceedings despite the fact that Phoenix had all of the
necessary characteristics to be subject to the registration requirements. 498 F. Supp. at
1243.
, See 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-3(a) (1980). Rule 12b-3(a) states that securities will be deemed
registered in connection with mergers, exchanges of assets, or other corporate successions
if the new securities are issued to the holders of another issuer's securities that are
registered under § 12(g). Id.
1 498 F. Supp. at 1244.
9 Id.
40 Id. at 1245. The Texas International court found that TI owned, as a result of the of-
fer, over 5% of Phoenix securities, a final requirement of § 14(d). Id.; see note 10 supra.
'1 498 F. Supp. at 1245. The court did not grant the SEC a permanent injunction
against TI because the SEC had not shown sufficient cause for the injunction. Id. at 1254.
Reasoning that TI had in good faith attempted to comply with the federal statutes, the
court concluded that TI's erroneous construction of the law could not justify a permanent in-
junction. Id.
42 Id. at 1251. The SEC made four allegations of material misrepresentation, but only
one contention survived a motion for summary judgment. See id. at 1246.
1 Id. The SEC relied on Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), which held
100319811
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relied on Aaron v. SEC,44 which held that the scienter requirement is ap-
plicable to injunctive actions under section 10(b). 5 The court in Texas In-
ternational, following Aaron, determined that the similarity between the
antifraud provisions of section 10(b) and section 14(e) justifies use of the
scienter requirement in section 14(e) actions." Although the Texas Inter-
national court found no scienter by TI,47 the court nonetheless extended
the scienter requirement of section 10(b) injunctive actions to section
14(e) injunctive actions.48
The Texas International court's application of sections 14(d) and 14(e)
to TI's offer appropriately promotes the policies underlying the Williams
Act. Although TI's offer to purchase KRC's creditors' claims was an un-
conventional method of corporate acquisition, the court recognized that
the offer contained many of the elements of conventional tender offers
and introduced many of the dangers that the Williams Act seeks to
prevent.49 In finding that TI's offer amounted to a tender offer under the
Williams Act, the court properly emphasized the pressure factors on the
target creditors that are identical to shareholder pressure factors in con-
ventional tender offers.50 Since TI's offer also contained conventional
tender offer solicitation characteristics such as a large number of
solicitees," the court's finding of a tender offer was correct. The court
also correctly construed the Williams Act to find that TI's tender offer
that scienter is an essential element of a private fraud action for damages under § 10(b). 498
F. Supp. at 1251; see 425 U.S. at 193 n.12.
" 446 U.S. 680 (1980).
" Id. at 695. In Aaron, the SEC filed an injunctive suit against a managerial employee
of a securities broker and alleged that the employee had violated § 17(a) of the Securities
Act of 1933 ('33 Act) and § 10(b) of the '34 Act by fraudulently conducting a sales campaign
for certain securities. Id. at 682-84. The Court reversed the court of appeals ruling that
proof of negligence is sufficient to find a violation of § 10(b) of the '34 Act in civil injunctive
proceedings. Id. at 702. Aaron's requirement of scienter may have a spillover effect on other
fraud provisions of the securities laws. See Steinberg, Aaron's Unanswered Questions, 4
CORP. L. REV. 166, 168-69 (1981).
11 Id. at 1252. Lower courts have required scienter in private actions under § 14(e).
See, e.g., Lowenschuss v. Kane, 520 F.2d 255, 268 n.10 (2d Cir. 1975) (knowledge or reckless
disregard required, but not mere negligence); Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d
579, 606 (5th Cir. 1974) (some culpability beyond mere negligence required); Chris-Craft In-
dus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 362-63 (2d Cir. 1973) (knowing or reckless
failure to discharge obligation required).
1, 498 F. Supp. at 1253. The Texas International court applied Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), to find that TI's misrepresentations were neither knowingly
nor recklessly made. 498 F. Supp. at 1252-53. The court relied on Ernst & Ernst rather than
Aaron to examine the elements of scienter because Ernst & Ernst provided the more
precise definition of scienter. Id. at 1252.
48 Id.
11 Id. at 1240; see note 30 supra.
0 498 F. Supp. at 1240; see Tender Offer, supra note 13, at 693-95; text accompanying
notes 3-7; 22-23 supra.
, See text accompanying note 22 supra.
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was for a class of equity securities registered under the '34 Act.2 TI's of-
fer failed technically to be for equity securities because TI bought
creditors' claims, not stock." TI's offer also was not for registered stock,
because KRC's registration was cancelled and Phoenix had not yet
registered. 4 The court overcame these technical deficiencies by examin-
ing the purposes of the Williams Act. Concluding that congressional in-
tent to provide full disclosure to investors would be thwarted if TI's of-
fer could escape scrutiny under the Act, the court applied section 14(d)
to TI's offer." Since the Act is directed to full disclosure in the securities
markets and since TI's offer possessed many of the characteristics of
transactions covered by the Act, the court correctly refused to permit
the unorthodox nature of the reorganization plan to allow TI to avoid
liability under section 14(d).5 6
The Texas International court's extension of the scienter require-
ment to injunctive action under section 14(e) also comports with the pur-
poses of the Williams Act and with judicial precedent.' Both section
10(b) and section 14(e) are designed to prevent fraud and deception in the
securities markets. 8 Several federal courts have favored a culpability
standard such as the scienter requirement to private fraud actions under
section 14(e).59 Since tender offer fraud and general securities fraud are
substantially similar, no reason exists to depart from the guidance of the
Supreme Court with regard to scienter in fraud actions under the '34
Act.6"
B. Lewis v. McGraw-Hill
Section 14(e) of the Williams Act' prohibits material misrepresenta-
tions and fraudulent practices in connection with a tender offer.2
I See text accompanying notes 31 & 32 supra. Cf. E.H.I. of Florida, Inc. v. Insurance
Co. of North America, 499 F. Supp. 1053, 1064 (1980) (offer to purchase corporation's assets
from bondholders not offer for equity securities since no ownership interest involved).
See text accompanying note 20 supra.
See text acommpanying notes 34 & 35 supra.
498 F. Supp. at 1245; see text accompanying notes 36-39 supra.
498 F. Supp. at 1243.
67 See text accompanying notes 8-12 supra.
See discussion of similarity of § 10(b) & § 14(e) in Lewis, part B infra.
5 See note 46 supra.
See text accompanying note 45 supra.
15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1976 & Supp. III 1979), amending Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C § 78a-78kk (1976 & Supp. III 1979). Congress promulgated the
Williams Act to alleviate pressure on target shareholders by requiring the offeror to
disclose fully information pertinent to the tender offer. See H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong.,
2d Sess. 2, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG & AD. NEws 2811, 2813. See generally Piper
v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
2 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976). Section 14(e) prohibits "any untrue statement [or omission]
of any material fact [that is] misleading, or ... any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative
10051981]
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Although section 14(e) parallels the general securities fraud prohibition
in section 10(b) of the '34 Act,3 the two provisions differ in one respect.
Section 10(b) prohibits fraudulent conduct in connection with an actual
purchase or sale of a security.4 Section 14(e), however, does not contain a
purchase or sale limitation and thus permits nonpurchasing or nonselling
parties who otherwise have standing to challenge all misrepresentations
in connection with a tender offer., Accordingly, courts have permitted
non-tendering shareholders to sue for damages under section 14(e), pro-
vided that the transaction giving rise to the misrepresentations actually
constitutes a tender offer.' The question remains whether a party can
sue for damages under section 14(e) for misrepresentations in connection
with an unrealized or proposed tender offer.7
In Lewis v. McGraw-Hill,8 the Second Circuit determined that when a
proposed tender offer has never become effective and target share-
holders have never detrimentally relied on management's alleged mis-
statements, the shareholders have no section 14(e) damages claim
against management In Lewis, the American Express Company
acts or practices, in connection with any tender offer." A tender offer consists of an invita-
tion by one company to purchase a significant amount of another company's stock at a
premium price. See Note, The Developing Meaning of "Tender Offer" Under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1250, 1250-51 (1973). Tender offers are usually a
part of a takeover attempt. See id, at 1253.
' See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976). Section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 prohibit fraudulent or
misleading acts in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. Id.; 17 C.F.R. § 240
10b-5 (1980); see note 2 supra.
' See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976); 3 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD &
COMMODITIES FRAUD, § 8.8 (1979); note 3 supra. Several courts have denied potential plain-
tiffs standing to sue under § 10(b) because the plaintiffs were not defrauded purchasers or
sellers. See, e.g., Iroquois Indus., Inc. v. Syracuse China Corp., 417 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 399 U.S. 909 (1970) (tender offeror did not rely on target management's
misstatements); Greater Iowa Corp. v. McLendon, 378 F.2d 783 (8th Cir. 1967) (target com-
pany has no claim against fraudulent offeror); Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d
461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952) (nontendering shareholders have no claim
against offeror).
' See note 2 supra. See also E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE
CONTROL 116-17 (1973) [hereinafter cited as ARANOW & EINHORN]. Private litigants must
prove that § 14(e) permits an implied private right of action in order to have standing to sue.
See generally, Maher, Implied Private Rights of Action and the Federal Securities Laws:
A Historical Perspective, 37 WASH & LEE L. REV. 783 (1980).
' See, e.g., Butler Aviation Int'l, Inc. v. Comprehensive Designers, Inc., 307 F. Supp.
910 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), affl'd, 425 F.2d 842 (2d Cir. 1970); Electronic Speciality Co. v. Interna-
tional Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1969); Neuman v. Elec. Specialty Co., [1969
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 92,591, at 98,705 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
7 In Levine v. Seilon, Inc., 439 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1971), a shareholder brought an action
for damages under § 14(e) against the issuer for announcing a tender offer that it never in-
tended to make. The district court dismissed the case because no tender offer was made.
See id. at 335. On appeal, the Second Circuit dismissed the case on other grounds, but com-
mented that the district court's reading of § 14(e) may have been too restrictive. See id
' 619 F.2d 192 (2d Cir. 1980).
' Id. at 193, 195-96. The court in Lewis noted that the shareholders could recast their
claims as state law actions for the directors' breach of fiduciary duty. Id. at 195; see Santa
Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
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(AMEXCO) made two tender offer proposals to McGraw-Hill, Inc."
McGraw-Hill's board of directors opposed the first proposal despite the
premium price that AMEXCO offered." The McGraw-Hill directors char-
acterized AMEXCO's initial offer as reckless, illegal, and improper.
2
AMEXCO withdrew that proposal before the offer became effective and
submitted a second proposal at a higher premium expressly contingent
upon the approval of McGraw-Hill's management. 3 The McGraw-Hill
board rejected AMEXCO's second proposal as inadequate, and the pro-
posed offer expired without ever becoming effective. 4
McGraw-Hill's shareholders brought suit for damages in federal
district court against McGraw-Hill and its directors by alleging that the
directors made material, false statements in violation of section 14(e).
5
McGraw-Hill moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. 6 To address McGraw-Hill's motion, the district court con-
sidered whether the shareholders had alleged that management's con-
duct was "in connection with" a tender offer under section 14(e),
7 and if
so, whether the shareholders relied on and were injured by manage-
ment's conduct.'" Ther court concluded that the McGraw-Hill share-
holders' claim was within section 14(e) because AMEXCO had made a
public announcement of the proposed tender offer and had established a
clear intent to make the offer. 9 Nevertheless, the court determined that
" 619 F.2d at 194. AMEXCO initially offered to purchase 49% of McGraw-Hill's shares
for $34 each. Id. At the time of AMEXCO's announcement, the market price of McGraw-
Hill's securities was $26 per share. Id. AMEXCO's second offer was at a price of $40 per
share, and AMEXCO offered to buy all of the McGraw-Hill shares. Id.
Id.
12 Id.
11 Id. AMEXCO's second offer would not become effective unless McGraw-Hill promis-
-ed not to oppose the offer by "propaganda, lobbying, or litigation." Id.
14 Id.
"1 [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,195, at 96,566 (S.D.N.Y.
1979). The plaintiff shareholders in Lewis alleged that the defendants wrongfully described
AMEXCO's offer as inadequate despite their knowledge that the offer price was fair. Id. at
96,567. Plaintiffs further contended that the defendants had sullied the integrity of
AMEXCO through various spurious allegations. Id. Finally, plaintiffs contended that the
director's characterization of the initial offer as improper was false because earlier,
McGraw-Hill had described AMEXCO as a proper and desirable merger partner. Id.
," Id.; see FED. R. Civ. P. 12. McGraw-Hill claimed that no § 14(e) damages claim could
arise because no tender offer ever existed. See [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 97,195, at 96,568.
17 [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,195, at 96,568; see note 2
supra.
11 [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,195, at 96,570. The district
court in Lewis also considered defendant's argument that plaintiffs had alleged merely
breaches of fiduciary duty which are not actionable under § 14(e). Id. at 96,569. The court
concluded that plaintiffs alleged both nondisclosure and misleading disclosure, which can be
viewed as manipulative or deceptive acts under § 14(e). Id. Accordingly, the court refused to
dismiss the claim for lack of alleged deception. Id.
," Id. at 96,568. The district court in Lewis relied on two cases that permitted § 14(e)
injunctive actions for proposed tender offers. See id.; Reserve Management Corp. v. Anchor
Daily Income Fund, Inc., 459 F. Supp. 597, 608 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Applied Digital Data Sys.,
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the complaint lacked the requisite showing of reliance and causation
since the shareholders were never in a position to make a decision that
would have caused them any loss.2" Finding reliance impossible, the
district court granted McGraw-Hill's motion and dismissed the share-
holder's claim.21
On appeal, the Second Circuit held that the shareholders' complaint
against McGraw-Hill was properly dismissed." The court based its
holding on the absence of detrimental reliance by the shareholders.'
While acknowledging that reliance may be presumed from the material-
ity of the alleged misstatements,24 the court declined to make that
presumption in Lewis. 5 The court reasoned that reliance was impossible
because the shareholders never had an opportunity to tender their
shares." In contrast to the district court, the Second Circuit did not
specifically address the issue whether the McGraw-Hill shareholders had
alleged conduct in connection with a tender offer under section 14(e).
The Second Circuit evaded the crucial issue that Lewis presents.
The court failed to consider whether a damages claim can arise from sec-
tion 14(e) where the tender offer never materializes. 8 The district court,
Inc. v. Milgo Elec. Corp., 425 F. Supp. 1145, 1155 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). Reserve Management in-
terpreted Applied Digital as allowing § 14(e) actions only where the offer has been publicly
announced and the offeror has established a clear intent to make the offer. 459 F. Supp. at
608. The district court in Lewis rejected defendant's suggestion that Applied Digital per-
tains only to injunctive actions and could not be used as precedent for Lewis, a damages ac-
tion. [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,195, at 97,568. The court
reasoned that Applied Digital did not so limit its reasoning and that to preclude an action
for damages under § 14 would be inconsistent with the purpose of § 14. Id.; see text accom-
panying notes 29-36 infra.
[1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,195, at 97,570. The district
court in Lewis explained that plaintiffs alleged that the defendants frustrated consumma'
tion of the proposed tender offer, but that plaintiffs alleged no reliance by shareholders or
AMEXCO. Id. Frustration of a tender offer alone will not create a § 14(e) action. See
Rediker v. Geon Indus., Inc., 464 F. Supp. 73, 82 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
" [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,195, at 97,570-71.
' 619 F.2d at 195.
2' See id, The Lewis court stated that an element of a cause of action under § 14(e) is a
showing of reliance by shareholders on the alleged misrepresentation. Id. (citing Chris-Craft
Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973)).
" 619 F.2d at 195; see Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 385 (1970) (reliance
presumable from materiality where too burdensome to prove otherwise); Chris-Craft Indus.,
Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 375 (2d Cir. 1973) (reliance presumable only when
logical).
619 F.2d at 195.
26 Id. The McGraw-Hill shareholders were never given an opportunity to tender their
shares. Rather, they received information which caused them to anticipate having the op-
portunity to tender. See id.
I Compare [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,195, at 97,568
with 619 F.2d at 195. The Lewis court obliquely noted that statements may be in connection
with a tender offer only if reliance can be presumed and the tender offer becomes effective.
619 F.2d at 195; see note 44 infra.
619 F.2d at 193-96. The appeals court in Lewis correctly characterized the issue as
whether the shareholders could maintain an action for damages under § 14(e) where no
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however, did address the issue directly and held that a damages claims
under section 14(e) for statements about a proposed tender offer should
be permitted.' In so finding, the district court relied on two cases that
permitted injunctive relief for proposed tender offers to address the
Lewis question of monetary relief." These courts permitted injunctive
actions under section 14(e) so long as the proposed offer was publicized
and the offeror exhibited a definite intent to make the offer. 1 The courts
stated that if these two criteria are met, then the plainiff will have alleg-
ed conduct "in connection with" a tender offer that is actionable under
section 14(e).32
The rationale that has supported injunctive actions for proposed
tender offers is equally applicable to damages actions for ineffective
tender offers.3 Courts have held that the public announcement of a pro-
posed tender offer presents the dangers of misrepresentation that sec-
tion 14(e) was designed to prevent. 4 In situations where the damage is
already done, injunctive relief would be pointless. As the district court
in Lewis correctly concluded, if damages claims under section 14(e) for
proposed tender offers are prohibited, then target companies would
have a safe harbor from liability if they successfully used deception to
thwart a proposed tender offer. 5 The broad remedial purposes of section
14(e) mandate that material misrepresentations in connection with pro-
posed tender offers be subject to effective challenge.3 1 In the future,
tender offer had been made, but the court addressed only the question of the shareholder's
reliance. Id. at 193.
[1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,195, at 97,568; see text ac-
companying notes 17-19 supra.
[1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,195, at 97,568. See, e.g.,
Reserve Management Corp.* v. Anchor Daily Income Fund, Inc., 459 F. Supp. 597, 608
(S.D.N.Y. 1978); Applied Digital Data Sys., Inc. v. Milgo Elec. Corp., 425 F. Supp. 1145, 1155
(S.D.N.Y. 1977). See also note 19 supra.
3, 459 F. Supp. at 608.
Id.; see note 19 supra.
See Reserve Management Corp. v. Anchor Daily Income Fund, Inc., 459 F. Supp.
597, 608 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Applied Digital Data Sys., Inc. v. Milgo Elec. Corp., 425 F. Supp.
1145, 1155 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); text accompanying notes 31 & 32 supra. Cf. Berman v. Gerber
Products Co., 454 F. Supp. 1310, 1317-18 (W.D. Mich. 1978) (dismissal of § 14(e) damages
claim because tender offer proposal not firm).
I Applied Digital Data Sys., Inc. v. Milgo Elec. Corp., 425 F. Supp. 1145, 1155
(S.D.N.Y. 1977).
[1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. 97,195, at 97,568.
The court in Applied Digital reasoned that to limit the disclosure and fair dealing
provisions of the '34 Act to the time after an offer actually has been made would thwart the
purposes of § 14(e). 425 F. Supp. at 1154.
The Supreme Court's emphasis on the broad remedial purposes of the '34 Act was
established in J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964). In Borak, the Supreme Court
liberally construed the federal securities laws to find an implied private right of action
under § 14(a) of the '34 Act. Id. at 432. The Court focused on Congress' intent to protect in-
vestors as the justification for implying a private right of action. Id. at 431-32. Recently,
however, the Supreme Court has established a restrictive approach to implying a private
cause of action under the securities laws. The Supreme Court now emphasizes congressional
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courts should follow the lead of the district court in Lewis by permitting
actions for damages under section 14(e) for statements in connection
with proposed tender offers.
Although allowing such damages claims will afford investors more
remedies than currently exist, the practical difficulties of proving a
shareholder's reliance under section 14(e) when no tender offer exists
reduces the impact of these damages actions. The Lewis case exhibits
circumstances in which the target shareholders likely were harmed
because they lost the opportunity to respond to a proposed tender offer
that could have become effective absent target management's opposition
to the proposal.37 Since the proposed tender offer never became effec-
tive, the shareholders never received an opportunity to rely on manage-
ment's evaluation of AMEXCO's proposed offer. 8 In other cir-
cumstances, however, reliance may indeed be possible. For example, if a
person announces a proposed tender offer solely to sell his own lot of the
target's securities at higher prices, target shareholders may have a sec-
tion 14(e) damages claim against the offeror. 9 In reliance on his proposed
offer, target shareholders may decline to sell in the market at a
favorable price while waiting to tender their shares to the offeror. Once
the fraudulent offeror has disposed of his shares at a favorable price and
has withdrawn the proposed tender offer, the harmed shareholders
could gain nothing by an injunctive suit." A damages action would be
the only means of giving the shareholders an effective remedy for the of-
feror's misstatements, and the shareholders could successfully claim the
requisite reliance.41
The Second Circuit decided Lewis solely on the McGraw-Hill
shareholders' lack of reliance on the directors' statements. 2 The Lewis
court failed to consider whether the shareholders had standing to sue for
damages under section 14(e) for statements "in connection with" a
tender offer. The district court in Lewis, however, held that
intent as expressed in the statutory language and the legislative history of the statute in
question. See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568-69 (1979); Blue Chip Stamps
v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 754-55 (1975). The Court's current strict constructionist
approach to granting implied private rights of action indicates that the implication of
damages claims under § 14(e) for tender offers not actually made will be subject to severe
judicial scrutiny. See generally Note, Section 17(a) of the '33 Act: Defining the Scope of
Antifraud Protection, 37 WASH. & LEE. L. REv. 859 (1980).
See text accompanying notes 9-14 supra.
See 619 F.2d at 194-195; accord, Rediker v. Geon Indus., Inc., 464 F. Supp. 73, 82
(S.D.N.Y. 1978).
9 See Levine v. Seilon, Inc., 439 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1971). Levine raised the issue of §
14(e) damages claims for tender offers never actually made, but the court dismissed the
claim without reaching the § 14(e) question. Id. at 335; see ARANOW & EINHORN, supra note
5, at 123 (discussion of Levine); note 7 supra.
40 See text accompanying notes 34-35 supra.
' See notes 23 & 24 supra.
42 See text accompanying notes 22-28 supra.
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shareholders could bring a section 14(e) damages action despite the
tender offer never having been made.43 Consequently, the Second Cir-
cuit's failure to address this issue leaves in doubt the availability of sec-
tion 14(e) damages claims for ineffective tender offers.4 Although the
district court's opinion represents the correct approach to section 14(e)
damages claims," a definitive resolution of the issue must await further
judicial deliberation.
C. McDermott, Inc. v. Wheelabrator-Frye, Inc.
Section 14(d)(4) of the Williams Act enables the SEC to prescribe
rules and regulations governing solicitation of tender offers as a means
of protecting investors.' Pursuant to section 14(d)(4), the SEC adopted
rule 14d-4(c) which requires tender solicitors to disseminate information
on any material changes in a tender offer.2 The rule obligates the
solicitor to distribute the information in a manner reasonably designed
to inform the target shareholders of the change.3 In addition, SEC rule
14e-l(b) requires tender offers that have undergone an increase in of-
fered consideration to remain open for ten days following the increase.4
Similarly, rule 14e-l(a) requires all tender offers to remain open for a
minimum of twenty days.5 While the SEC has established the length of
time that a tender offer must remain effective after the solicitor raises
0 [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 97,195, at 96,568; see text ac-
companying notes 17-21 supra.
" The Second Circuit's focus on reliance in Lewis may be construed as an acceptance
of the district court's holding that the shareholders had established standing under § 14(e).
See text accompanying notes 17-19, 23-27 supra. On the other hand, the court's brief men-
tion of an effective tender offer as a requirement of a section 14(e) damages claim, see note
27 supra, may contradict the district court and indicate that the Second Circuit will not
allow damages claims to arise from tender offers not actually made. See 619 F.2d at 195;
text accompanying notes 27 & 28 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 33-36 supra.
15 U.S.C. § 78n(d}(4) (1976). Section 14(d)(4) regulates both solicitation of tender of-
fers and recommendations to shareholders to accept or reject an offer. Id. The SEC has pro-
mulgated rules under § 14(d)(4) that promote adequate disclosure to shareholders and the
public to ensure that investors can make informed decisions. See Texasgulf, Inc. v. Canada
Dev. Corp., 366 F. Supp. 374, 420 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
2 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-4(c) (1980). Rule 14d-4(c) also has statutory authority in 15
U.S.C. §§ 77g, 77j, 77s(a), 77ttt(a), 78c(b), 78j(b), 78m, 78n, 78w(a) (1976 & Supp. III 1979). See
44 Fed. Reg. 70,341 (Dec. 6, 1979).
3 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-4(c) (1980).
17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-l(b) (1980). Rule 14e-l(b), promulgated pursuant to § 14(e), is
designed to prevent manipulative practices by the solicitor. Id.; see 44 Fed. Reg. 70,348
(Dec. 6, 1979).
5 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-l(a) (1980). In promulgating rule 14e-l(a), the SEC determined
that tender offers must be open at least twenty days to provide shareholders with access to
all information and to prevent deceptive acts by the offeror. Id.; see 44 Fed. Reg. 70,384
(Dec. 6, 1979).
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the offered consideration,8 rule 14d-4(c) does not state the amount of
time, if any, during which a tender offer must remain open after the of-
feror makes a material change in the offer.'
In McDermott, Inc. v. Wheelabrator-Frye, Inc., the Seventh Circuit
considered whether an increase in the number of shares sought in a
tender offer requires an extension of the offering period of the tender of-
fer. The court determined that such an increase does not require a
twenty day extension of the offering period because the increase does
not constitute a new tender offer subject to rule 14e-l(a).9 McDermott
and Wheelabrator made rival tender offers for control of a third corpora-
tion, Pullman, Inc." During the offer, Wheelabrator increased the
number of shares it sought to purchase but changed no other terms of
the offer." Through the increased offer, Wheelabrator changed its poten-
tial ownership of Pullman shares from 27% to 49%.12 In effect, the in-
crease would have given Wheelabrator control of Pullman."3 On the day
of Wheelabrator's increase, McDermott appeared before the district
court to request a temporary restraining order against Wheelabrator's
increased offer, which would have expired at the end of that day. 4
McDermott alleged that Wheelabrator had made a new tender offer for
Pullman shares by increasing the number of shares sought."5 McDermott
contended, therefore, that Wheelabrator had violated rule 14e-l(a) of the
' See text accompanying notes 4 & 5 supra.
' See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-4(c) (1980). Although rule 14d-4(c) contains no specific re-
quirement extending the offer to allow for dissemination of information on material
changes, the rule requires prompt dissemination in a reasonably informative manner. No
court has previously litigated the implication of a time requirement in rule 14d-4(c).
' [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,687, at 98,609 (7th Cir.
1980).
, Id. at 98,611; see text accompanying notes 20-22 infra.
,0 [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 97,687, at 98,609. Pullman
favored being acquired by Wheelabrator and was hostile to the offer by McDermott. Id.
Wheelabrator's original offer was for 3,000,000 of Pullman's 11,150,000 outstanding shares
at $52.50 per share. Id. McDermott had offered to purchase 5,400,000 shares of Pullman at
$43.50 per share. Id. Wheelabrator had received over 1,000,000 shares, while McDermott
had garnered almost 4,000,000. Id. at 98,610.
" Id. Wheelabrator increased the number of Pullman shares it sought to 5,500,000. Id.
The increase had no immediate impact on the number of shares tendered, presumably
because arbitragers were holding out for a reactionary increase by McDermott. Id.
11 Id. at 98,613 (Pell, J., dissenting).
13 Id.
" Id. at 98,610. McDermott increased its offering price subsequent to Wheelabrator's
increase in order to attract some of Pullman's shareholders who had previously tendered
to Wheelabrator. Id. McDermott requested a restraining order which would have given
Pullman shareholders more time to withdraw their shares tendered to Wheelabrator and
tender them to McDermott. Paradoxically, by the expiration date of Wheelabrator's offer,
almost all of the shares provisionally tendered to McDermott were withdrawn and tendered
to Wheelabrator. [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,687, at 98,610.
11 Id. McDermott argued that Wheelabrator's increase in the number of securities
sought was such a material change that it constituted an entirely new tender offer. Id.
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Williams Act by not extending its tender offer for another twenty days."
The district court granted McDermott's motion and ordered Wheelabra-
tor to extend its changed tender offer by twenty days."
On appeal to the Seventh Circuit, Wheelabrator sought to vacate the
district court's order.'8 In deciding to lift the restraining order, the
Seventh Circuit disagreed with the district court's ruling that an in-
crease in the number of shares solicited constitutes a new tender offer.'9
The court reasoned that the SEC regulations do not treat an increase in
consideration as a new tender offer and require only a ten day exten-
sion. ' ° An increase in the number of shares sought, therefore, should not
be subject to the more extensive twenty day requirement.2' The court
concluded that the restraining order could not be based upon McDer-
mott's argument that the increase in the number of shares constituted a
new tender offer.'
McDermott also asserted a new argument on appeal based on the
dissemination requirements for material changes under rule 14d-4(c).3
McDermott argued that Wheelabrator's increase in the number of
shares sought was a material change in information that required
Wheelabrator to extend the offer for a reasonable period of time so that
the increase could be disclosed.24 The Seventh Circuit failed to decide
that the increase was material information.' The court ruled, however,
that if rule 14d-4(c) did require the offer to remain open for a reasonable
time beyond the increase, then the six days that passed between the
district court's order and the appeal clearly were adequate for the infor-
mation to be disseminated. 8 Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit vacated
the district court's order that had extended Wheelabrator's offer for
twenty daysY The Seventh Circuit's holding in McDermott, however, will
be of little precedential value because the court refused to find that a
18 Id.
, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP (CCH) 97,687, at 98,610. The district
court reasoned that the twenty day extension was necessary so that tendering shareholders
who choose to do so would have time to withdraw their shares from Wheelabrator. Id.
" Id. at 98,610 & n.5.
" Id. at 98,611.
" Id.; see 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-1 (1980); note 4 supra.
21 [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. RaP. (CCH) 97,687, at 98,611. The McDer-
mott court noted the illogicality of assuming that the SEC would limit to ten days the
dissemination period for changes in consideration, yet impose a twenty day requirement for
changes in the number of shares sought. Id.
SId.
' Id.; see 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-4(c) (1980); text accompanying notes 2 & 3 supra.
2 [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. Sac. L. REP. (CCH) 97,687, at 98,611.
,Id. The McDermott court assumed, but expressly did not decide, that the regula-
tions required Wheelabrator's offer to remain outstanding for a reasonable period. Id.
' Id. Since the time between the district court's holding and the circuit court's rever-
sal was an appropriate period of time for dissemination of the changed offer, the Seventh Cir-
cuit did not remand McDermott to the district court to fix the reasonable time. Id.
"Id.
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change in the number of shares sought in a tender offer is a material
change requiring a reasonable time for dissemination.28
Wheelabrator's increased offer almost doubled the number of Pull-
man shares it was seeking and, thereby, created the potential for effec-
tive control of Pullman.' The likelihood of a change in corporate control
to which the increased offer gave rise reasonably could affect the deci-
sions of tendering shareholders." The court thus would have been en-
tirely correct in finding that an increase in the number of shares sought
requires a reasonable extension of the offering period. Since the court
refused to make that determination, McDermott stands only for the pro-
position that an increase in the number of shares sought is not a new
tender offer."
D. Proposed Rule 13e-2
Corporations commonly acquire their own stock through stock
repurchase plans.1 An issuer may choose to repurchase some of its own
stock to increase financial leverage,2 to reduce shareholder services
costs, 3 or to entrench itself in the face of takeover proposals.4 Some
See text accompanying notes 25 & 26 supra.
See text accompanying note 12 supra.
See [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 97,687, at 98,613 (Pell, J.,
dissenting).
3, See text accompanying notes 19-22 supra.
Nathan & Sobel, Corporate Stock Repurchases in the Context of Unsolicited
Takeover Bids, 35 Bus. LAW. 1545, 1545 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Nathan & Sobel]. An
issuer may repurchase its stock through an open market transaction, a privately negotiated
purchase, or through a cash tender offer. Id. An issuer may have a variety of business
reasons for repurchasing the stock. See text accompanying notes 2-5 infra. See generally
Manges, SEC Regulation of Issuer and Third Party Tender Offers, 8 SEC. REG. L. J. 275
(1981).
Most states have statutes that permit stock repurchases. See 1 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT
ANN. § 5 J 5 (1976). Repurchases may not, however, force the corporation into insolvency or
impair the corporation's stated capital. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 160 (1980); OHIO
REV. CODE § 1701 (1980); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 5 (1976). Federal regulation of issuer
repurchases is based on § 13(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ('34 Act). See 15
U.S.C. § 78m(e) (1976); text accompanying notes 7-16 infra.
2 Zilber, Corporate Tender Offers for Their Own Stock- Some Legal and Financial
Considerations, 33 U. CIN. L. REV. 315, 317-19 (1964). Repurchases can strengthen a corpora-
tion's financial position in a number of ways. Issuers may want to acquire stock for future
acquisitions without diluting present capital, to reduce excess cash, or to recapitalize the
corporation. Id.
' Note, Corporate Stock Repurchases Under the Federal Securities Laws, 66 COLUM.
L. REV. 1292, 1293 (1966). The expense of notifying small shareholders of corporate pro-
ceedings may surpass the small shareholders' earnings and may justify the corporation's at-
tempt to eliminate these small shareholders. See id.
Nathan & Sobel, supra note 1, at 1546. A repurchase may ward off a prospective
tender offer by increasing the percentage of stock held by a dedicated control group or by
raising the price beyond that which the bidder is willing to pay. Id. at 1557.
TENDER OFFER DEVELOPMENTS
repurchase plans are transactions that eliminate public shareholders and
concomitant federal regulation.' Since repurchases are conducted by cor-
porate insiders who may be able to coerce or pressure shareholders into
tendering their shares for the sole benefit of the corporation, courts
have concluded that repurchasing corporations should sustain a heavier
burden of disclosure and fair dealing than purchasers who are not affi-
liated with the corporation.'
Consistent with the aims of the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC) to protect investors and to encourage the smooth operation of
financial markets,7 the SEC currently regulates issuer repurchases
through several different provisions under the '34 Act. Issuers are sub-
ject to the general fraud and manipulation prohibitions of rule 10b-5.'
Under rule 10b-6, issuers participating in the distribution of securities
may not bid for any of the securities until the distribution is completed.'
Section 14(e) prohibits all purchasers, including issuers, from making
material misrepresentations when purchasing shares through a tender
offer." Only one section of the '34 Act, however, directly pertains to
issuer repurchases." Section 13(e) enables the SEC to adopt rules and
regulations that govern purchases by an issuer of its own securities.12
Congress passed section 13(e) as part of the tender offer legislation in
I See E. ARANOW, H. EINHORN, & G. BERLSTEIN, DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS FOR
CORPORATE CONTROL 258-59 (1977) [hereinafter cited as CORPORATE CONTROL DEVELOPMENTS].
See generally Brudney, A Note on "Going Private," 61 VA. L. REV. 1019 (1975). Going
private transactions, in which the securities of the issuer will be held by fewer than 300 per-
sons, are subject to rule 13e-3 of the '34 Act. See 17 C.F.R. § 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3 (1980),
text accompanying note 62 infra.
' See, e.g. Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 598 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 873 (1974); Tanzer v. Haynie, 405 F. Supp. 650, 654-56 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Broder v.
Dane, 384 F. Supp. 1312, 1318 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). See also 1 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW
FRAUD § 6.4(1), at 125 (1975).
7 See Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 36 F. Supp. 790, 791 (D.C.N.Y. 1940).
8 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1980); 2 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW FRAUD § 7.3(3), at
159-60 (1975).
' See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-6 (1980). A distribution is a major selling effort by an issuer
of its securities. 2 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW FRAUD § 7.3(3), at 159 (1975). The SEC
grants exemptions from rule 10b-6 where a specific transaction does not present the poten-
tial for abuse that the rule seeks to prevent. See, e.g., Scientific Software Corp., [1973
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 79,532.
"2 See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976); see, e.g., Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579,
598 (5th Cir. 1974); Broder v. Dane, 384 F. Supp. 1312, 1318 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
" 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976); see note 12 infra. Sections 10(b) and 14(e) of the '34 Act are
provisions of general applicability to security transactions, but the sections may properly be
applied to specific repurchases. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b); 78n(e) (1976); text accompanying
notes 8-10 supra.
11 15 U.S.C. § 78m(e) (1976). Section 13(e; ,rohibits issuers from purchasing their own
securities if the purchases contravene SEC rules against fraudulent, deceptive or
manipulative acts. Id. The statute also enables the SEC to prescribe rules to prevent those
deceptive practices. Id.
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the Williams Act,13 but the section is not limited to regulating repur-
chases in connection with a tender offer." Nonetheless, the only rules
promulgated under section 13(e) to date apply to repurchases in the con-
text of a tender offer." The SEC, however, recently has proposed rule
13e-2 as a rule of general applicability_ to issuer repurchases."
Rule 13e-2 has a two-fold purpose. The primary purpose of rule 13e-2
is to provide guidance to issuers involved in legitimate repurchase pro-
grams." The SEC contends that current regulation of repurchases
through the general fraud and manipulation prohibitions is inadequate
because the regulation is piecemeal." The SEC has concluded that a rule
of specific applicability to repurchases is necessary to assist issuers and
their affiliates in avoiding the risk of liability for inadequate or improper
disclosure." The SEC also designed rule 13e-2 to curb the issuer's oppor-
tunity for abuse in a repurchase plan by limiting the ability of an issuer
to control the price of the securities.2 Controlling the price of a corpora-
tion's securities may be of special benefit to the controlling shareholders
or to incumbent management.2' Shareholders who have an interest in
maintaining control of the corporation may attempt to control the stock
'0 15 U.S.C. § §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1976), amending Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
" See note 12 supra.
" See note 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-1 (1980) (prohibiting issuer repurchase if third party has
filed tender offer proposal); § 240.13e-3 (regulating "going private" tender offers); §
240.13e-4 (regulating issuer tender and exchange offers).
" See SEC Release No. 33-6248; 34-17222; reprinted in [1980] 575 SEc. REG. & L. REP.
(BNA) (K-i) [hereinafter cited as Proposed Rule]. Three issuer repurchase rule proposals
have preceded the current proposed rule 13e-2. See Proposed Rule 10b-10, reprinted in,
Hearings on S.510 before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking and
Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 214-16 (1967) (first proposed rule); Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 8930 (July 13, 1970), 35 Fed. Reg. 11,410 (1970) (second proposed rule);
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 10539 (December 6, 1973) 38 Fed. Reg. 34,341 (1973)
(third proposed rule).
,7 See Proposed Rule, supra note 16, at K-4. Corporations that can relate repurchases
to a legitimate corporate purpose are unlikely to suffer judicial intervention. See, e.g., Na-
tional Union Elec. Corp. v. Nat'L Presto Indus., Inc., [1969 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 92,460 (W.D. Wis. 1969) (valid repurchase since part of longstanding reacquisi-
tion for corporation investments); Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 499, 199 A.2d 548, 554
(1964) (valid repurchase since good faith maintenance of proper business practice). Some
repurchase plans may not have a legitimate corporation purpose if the repurchase involves
a bad faith attempt by management to retain control. See Bennett v. Propp, 41 Del. Ch. 14,
187 A.2d 405 (1962).
, See text accompanying notes 51-62 infra.
Proposed Rule, supra note 16, at K-i; see text accompanying notes 51-56 infra.
Proposed Rule, supra note 16, at K-1. Issuers can control the price of their securities
through a repurchase because the market tends to respond favorably to actively traded
issues. 2 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW FRAUD § 7.3(3), at 159 (1975).
21 Proposed Rule, supra note 16, at K-2. Issuers may want to control the price of their
securities as a means of raising capital without diluting present ownership, or to enable the
issuer to make stock exchanges or purchase assets. Id.
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price to raise capital or purchase assets." Incumbent management may
discourage acquisition by hostile investors through inflating the price of
the issuer's securities." In light of these potential abuses, the SEC has
determined that specific regulation is necessary to prevent issuer con-
trol of the price of securities.24
To meet the goals of adequate guidance for issuers and elimination
of price control by issuers, the SEC included both purchase limitations
and disclosure requirements in proposed rule 13e-2.1 The purchase
limitations are a codification of prior SEC policy and interpretations of
the antifraud provisions as applied to issuer repurchases." To prevent
the issuer from dominating the market, the rule restricts the volume of
shares an issuer may repurchaseY The rule also prevents issuers from
establishing the opening or closing price of the security. 8 The SEC
adopted this limitation as necessary to prevent issuer price control. 9 As
another means of preventing issuer control, the rule prohibits issuer
Id. Controlling shareholders may choose to purchase more shares to increase their
control position and to eliminate dissident shareholders. See Nathan & Sobel, supra note 1,
at 1546.
1 Proposed Rule, supra note 16, at K-2. Repurchases designed to prevent or forestall
acquisition by an outsider are referred to as defensive stock acquisition programs. Nathan
& Sobel, supra note 1, at 1557. Defensive acquisitions may increase the number of shares
held by a safe control group, may raise the stock beyond which the offeror will pay, may
eliminate vulnerable shareholders, and may permit the issuer to settle with the offeror by
buying at a premium the offeror's stock. Id.
2" Proposed rule, supra note 16, at K-1. An essential purpose of the '34 Act is to pre-
vent manipulation of markets. See SEC v. Scott Taylor & Co., 183 F. Supp. 904, 906
(D.C.N.Y. 1959); note 16 supra.
" Proposed Rule, supra note 16, at K-2 (proposed rule 13e-2(d) & (e)). In addition to pur-
chase and disclosure requirements, see text accompanying notes 25-34 infra, rule 13e-2 con-
tains a general antifraud and antimanipulation provision similar to § 10(b) of the '34 Act. See
Proposed Rule, supra note 16, at K-20 (proposed rule 13e-2(b)).
Rule 13e-2 applies to issuers, affiliates, and affiliated purchasers. See id. at K-18 (pro-
posed rule 13e-2(a)). An issuer is a company with securities registered under § 12 or § 15(d)
of the '34 Act, or a closed-end investment company registered under the Investment Com-
pany Act of 1940. Id. (proposed rule 13e-2(3) & (4)). An affiliate is any person who control or
is under the control of the issuer. Id. (proposed rule 13e-2(a(1)). An affiliate purchaser in-
cludes persons who act with the issuer in acquiring the issuer's securities, who controls the
issuer's purchases, whose purchases are controlled by the issuer, or who controls the issuer
through owning the issuer's securities. Id. (proposed rule 13e-2(a)(2)). Brokers and dealers
are expressly excluded from the definition of affiliated purchasers, even if they participate
in a 13e-2 purchase. Id. (proposed rule 13e-2(a)(2)(iv)).
" Id. at K-2, K-4 & n.10 & 11; see text accompanying notes 35-43 infra.
" Proposed rule, supra note 16, at K-22 (proposed rule 13e-2(e)(4)). The volume limita-
tions of rule 13e-2 prohibit a purchase that. when added to all other 13e-2 purchases of that
day, exceeds the higher of one round lot or the number of round lots nearest to 15%h of the
security's trading volume. Id.
Id. at K-21 & 22 (proposed rule 13e-2(e)(2)). An issuer may not make a 13e-2 purchase
if that purchase would be the opening transaction of a national exchange or if the purchase
would be within one-half hour of the scheduled closing of the exchange. Id.
2 Id. at K-2; see text accompanying notes 20-24 supra.
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price leadership." Issuers also are restricted to purchasing through one
broker per day, so that they cannot create a misleading appearance of
widespread purchases. 1 The disclosure requirements of proposed rule
13e-2 attempt to inform investors participating in the market that an
issuer is purchasing its own securities." Only issuer repurchase pro-
grams acquiring more than 2% of the outstanding stock must comply
with the disclosure provisions. The provisions under rule 13e-2 require
issuers to disclose pertinent information in a manner reasonably design-
ed to inform investors of the pending repurchase. 4
Rule 13e-2 is patterned after two settlements arranged by the SEC
in 1966.11 In SEC v. Georgia Pacific Corp." and Genesco, Inc., 7 the SEC
enjoined two corporations from violating the antifraud and antimanipu-
lation provisions of the '34 Act. 8 Both corporations were involved in
repurchases for employee stock bonus plans. 9 In Georgia Pacific, a
federal district court imposed a consent judgment on the corportion that
included several disclosure and purchasing requirements."0 The SEC im-
I Proposed Rule, supra note 16, at K-22 (13e-2(e)(3)). The price limitations of rule 13e-2
prohibit an issuer from purchasing at a price higher than the highest current independent
bid or the last independent sale price. Id.
Id. at K-21 (proposed rule 13e-2(3)(1)).
Id. at K-2; see id. at K-21 (proposed rule 13e-2(d)). Issuers must disclose the pertinent
information "in a manner reasonably calculated to inform investors." Id. The disclosure
must include the time of the purchases, the maximum number of shares to be purchased, the
maximum amount of funds to be spent, the purpose of the acquisition, and any plan related
to the disposal of the shares. Id. The issuer must inform all persons acting in the transaction
that the transaction must be in accordance with rule 13e-2. Id.
Id. at K-21 (13e-2(d(1)).
Id. at K-2; see text accompanying note 6 supra. Proposed rule 13e-2 may exceed cur-
rent disclosure requirements in that rule 10b-5 does not obligate the issuer to disclose the
purpose of its purchase, whereas rule 13e-2 does require disclosure of purpose. See note 32
supra.
E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 236 & n.54
(1973) [hereinafter cited as ARANOW & EINHORN]. See also Proposed Rule, supra note 16, at
K-4 & n.10 & 11.
[1964-1966 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) J 91,692, at 95,525 (S.D.N.Y.
1966) [hereinafter cited as Georgia Pacific].
31 [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 77,354, at 82,649 (May 10,
1966) (prospectus) [hereinafter cited as Genesco].
" Georgia Pacific, supra note 36, at 95,525; Genesco, supra note 37, at 82,652-53; see
ARANOW & EINHORN, supra note 35, at 242 & n. 76.
3' Georgia Pacific, supra note 36, at 95,525; Genesco, supra note 36, at 82,650; see A.
BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW FRAUD § 7.3(3), at 160-61 (1975). The SEC alleged that Georgia
Pacific concentrated its purchases toward the end of the business day and did not attempt
to minimize the price paid. Id. Genesco's purchases of its own stock during a five year
period amounted to one-third of its entire trading, an amount the SEC viewed as excessive.
Id.
4' Georgia Pacific, supra note 36, at 95,525-26. The court enjoined Georgia Pacific from
all fraudulent or manipulative acts in connection with its repurchase, including bidding that
creates apparent active trading in Georgia Pacific stock. Id, at 95,525. The court also pro-
hibited Georgia Pacific from purchasing through more than one broker per day, from
establishing the opening or closing price of the securities, from engaging in price leadership,
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posed the same requirements on Genesco, which had voluntarily submit-
ted to the requirements in order to avoid possible violations of the anti-
manipulation and antifraud provisions of the '34 Act.41 The Georgia
Pacific and Genesco requirements include prohibitions against repur-
chases during a distribution, issuer establishment of the opening or clos-
ing price of the security, and use of more than one broker per day.42 Each
of these provisions is present in the proposed rule."
Most critics commenting on proposed rule 13e-2 have questioned the
need for and the propriety of the substantive regulations in the rule.44
One argument against the rule is that existing rules such as 10b-5, 10b-6,
13e-3 and 13e-4 prohibit every abuse that the proposed rule seeks to pre-
vent.4 5 The SEC has acknowledged that duplication of coverage may oc-
cur, 6 but has concluded that the rule is necessary to eliminate the
cumbersome "regulation by exemption" that currently exists.47 For ex-
ample, corporations wishing to purchase their own securities during a
distribution must solicit an exemption from rule 10b-6 through the Divi-
sion of Market Regulation of the SEC.48 The Division usually will condi-
tion the exemption upon compliance with certain disclosure and repur-
chasing restrictions that are now embodied in proposed rule 13e-2.49 If
rule 13e-2 becomes effective, the SEC has reasoned that these lengthy
individual review procedures would be unnecessary in most cases. 0
and from purchasing more than 10% per week of the New York Stock Exchange's average
weekly trading volume. Id. at 95,526. In addition, Georgia Pacific had to disclose pertinent
information to all persons whose securities were to be acquired. Id.
"' Genesco, supra note 37, at 82,652-53. The requirements that the SEC imposed on
Genesco were substantially identical to those imposed on Georgia Pacific. See id.; note 40
supra.
42 Georgia Pacific, supra note 36, at 95,525-26; Genesco, supra note 37, at 82,652-53.
" See Proposed Rule, supra note 16, at K-21 & 22; notes 9, 27-28, 31 supra. The SEC
cited Georgia Pacific and Genesco in the release for proposed rule 13e-2 as examples of
prior SEC regulation of repurchases. See Proposed Rule, supra note 16, at K-4 & n.10-11.
" See Letter from American Financial Enterprises, Inc. to SEC (January 15, 1981)
(SEC File No. S7-858) (issuer repurchases sufficiently regulated); Letter from Paul,
Hastings, Janofsky & Walker to SEC (January 15, 1981) (SEC File No. S7-858) (SEC's
jurisdiction to impose rule questionable since repurchases sufficiently regulated); Letter
from Walsh, Case, Coale, Brown & Burke to SEC (October 31, 1980) (SEC File No. S7-858)
(statutory and constitutional authority for prohibitions in rule questionable). See also Pro-
posed Rule, supra note 16, at K-5; text accompanying notes 64-70 infra.
"5 See Letter from American Financial Enterprises, Inc. to SEC (January 15, 1981)
(SEC File No. S7-858); Letter from Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker to SEC (January 15,
1981) (SEC File No. S7-858); text accompanying notes 51-63 infra.
" See Proposed Rule, supra note 16, at K-4; text accompanying notes 64-65 infra.
" See Proposed Rule, supra note 16, at K-4.
"' See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-6(f) (1980). Rule lOb-6 flatly prohibits any person from pur-
chasing a security that is the subject of a distribution if that person has a beneficial interest
in the security. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-6 (1980). See generally Whitney, Rule 10b-6: The Special
Study's Rediscovered Rule, 62 MICH. L. REV. 567 (1964).
" See Proposed Rule, supra note 16, at K-4 & n.14; text accompanying notes 35-43
supra.
Proposed Rule, supra note 16, at K-4. The SEC has proposed amendments to rule
lOb-6 that would eliminate the exemption procedure for issuers. Id. at K-3. The amendment
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Current regulation of issuer repurchases is not only cumbersome,
but also leaves the issuer unclear concerning the bounds of permissible
behavior. The regulation most applicable to issuer repurchases is rule
10b-5, which prohibits manipulative practices in the sale of securities.51
An issuer seeking to avoid liability under rule 10b-5 could not rely en-
tirely on cases applying rule 10b-5 because trading that would be
legitimate when done by an uninterested third party may constitute a
manipulative practice for an issuer.2 As a market participant, an
uninterested third party may establish the opening or closing price of a
security with impunity. 3 Issuer control of the opening or closing price,
however, creates the misleading impression that the price is market
determined, when in fact the issuer may have artificially raised the
price. 4 The issuer, therefore, may unwittingly violate rule 10b-5 for
manipulating the price of the security.5 Proposed rule 13e-2 directly pro-
hibits the issuer's unique incentives for manipulating the price and
delineates the types of illegal issuer behavior that rule 10b-5 has left
unclear.
Other current regulations of issuer repurchases are also of limited
guidance to an issuer in establishing a legitimate repurchase plan. Rule
10b-6, which prevents purchases by issuers during a distribution, applies
to repurchases only in limited circumstances.57 An issuer wishing to
repurchase during a distribution must solicit an exemption to be able to
conduct a repurchase. In addition to the exemption, the SEC will usu-
ally provide guidelines to prevent the issuer from engaging in manipula-
would permit issuers to purchase shares during a distribution if the purchases are made in
accordance with rule 13e-2. Id.
"' See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1980). See generally Kennedy, Transactions By a Corpora-
tion in Its Own Shares, 19 Bus. LAW. 319 (1964).
52 Several commentators have noted the unique insider status of issuers dealing in
their own shares and have concluded that rule lOb-5 exposes such issuers to broad but ill-
defined liability. See Kennedy, Transactions By A Corporation in Its Own Shares, 19 Bus.
LAW. 319, 326 (1964); Zilber, Corporation Tender Offers For Their Own Stock: Some Legal
And Financial Considerations, 33 U. CIN. L. REv. 315, 336-37 (1964); Comment, Rule 10b-5
and Purchase by a Corporation of its Own Shares, 61 Nw. U. L. REV. 307, 314 (1966). The
dearth of cases applying rule 10b-5 to issuer repurchases contributes to the issuer's risk of
inadvertent liability. See id. at 314 & n.41.
I Rule 10b-5 imposes no absolute purchasing limitations on insiders or outsiders. See
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1980); Proposed Rule, supra note 16, at K-19. Courts have found viola-
tions of 10b-5 for market manipulation, however, only where an insider performs the
manipulative acts. See Hundahl v. United Ben. Life Ins. Co., 465 F. Supp. 1349, 1362 (N.D.
Tex. 1979).
' See 2 A. BROMBERG. SECURITIES LAW FRAUD § 7.3(3), at 160 & n.78.1 (1975).
5 Id. Issuers, as insiders, may violate rule 10b-5 for nondisclosure if they do not
disclose information that would affect the stock price or that is unknown to the public. See
ARANOW & EINHORN, supra note 3, at 239.
See text accompanying notes 25-34 supra.
5 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-6(f); text accompanying notes 48-49 supra.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-6(f).
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tion during the repurchase.59 Adherence to the guidelines protects an
issuer from 10b-5 liability." An issuer repurchasing when no distribution
is present, however, will be subject to no guidelines and will risk liability
for inadvertent violations of 10b-5. 1 Similarly, rules 13e-3 and 13e-4 pro-
vide limited direction in the context of "going private" transactions and
tender offers.12 Issuers whose repurchases are not either for a going
private transaction or for a tender offer cannot rely on rules 13e-3 and
13e-4 to protect the issuer from 10b-5 liability because the rules are inap-
plicable. The failure of rules 10b-6, 13e-3, and 13e-4 to provide guidance
to all repurchase plans demonstrates the need for a rule of general appli-
cability to issuer repurchases. Rule 13e-2 would address all repurchase
plans that are not covered otherwise. 3 The rule likely will encourage
more legitimate repurchase plans because issuers would no longer risk
inadvertent liability and would have adequate guidelines to conduct a
legal repurchase.
Despite the explicit direction that proposed rule 13e-2 provides,
many securities lawyers prefer the current issuer repurchase regula-
tions because the rules are less intrusive than proposed rule 13e-2.1
4
These critics argue that the current regulation of issuer repurchases
renders the proposed rule unnecessary and therefore without statutory
authority.5 The SEC, however, has broad authority to determine which
regulations are necessary and then to promulgate the appropriate
rules.6 Section 13(e) of the '34 Act gives the SEC explicit power to adopt
substantive issuer repurchase rules in the public interest and for the
protection of investors. The legislative history of section 13(e) compels
the same conclusion. 6 Despite the Supreme Court's narrowing construc-
" See Proposed Rule, supra note 16, at K-4 & n.14. The SEC grants 10b-6 exemptions
where the transaction presents little potential for manipulative abuse. Id. at K-4 & n.13.
Id. at K-4.
e, Commentators have noted the risk of relying on unofficial SEC guidelines. See CoR-
PORATE CONTROL DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 5, at 259 & n.4; 2 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES
LAW FRAUD § 7.3(3), at 160.1 & n.81 (1975).
" See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3 & 4 (1980). Rules 13e-3 and 13e-4 prohibit fraudulent and
manipulative practices and set forth extensive disclosure requirements. See generally
Manges, SEC Regulation of Issuer and Third Party Tender Offers, 8 SEC. REG. L. J. 275
(1981).
Proposed Rule, supra note 16, at K-4.
See Letter from American Financial Enterprises, Inc. to SEC (January 15, 1981)
(SEC File No. S7-858); Letter from Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker to SEC (January 15,
1981) (SEC File No. S7-858); Letter from Walsh, Case, Coale, Brown & Burke to SEC (Octo-
ber 31, 1980) (SEC File No. S7-858).
Id.
See Proposed Rule, supra note 16, at K-5. The SEC cited §§ 2, 3, 9(a)(6), 9(b), 10(b),
13(e), 15(c) and 23(a) as enabling provisions for rule 13e-2. Id.; see 15 U.S.C. §§ 78b, 78c,
78i(a)(6), 78i(b), 78j(b), 78m(e), 78o(c), 78w(a) (1976).
" 15 U.S.C. § 78m(e) (1976).
14 See H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. II, reprinted in (1968) U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 2811, 2811-13. Prior to Congress' enactment of the Williams Act, the SEC
presented to Congress a proposed rule on issuer repurchases that was a close antecedent of
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tion of securities laws,69 the SEC still possesses broad authority to
establish rules such as 13e-2.7 °
Technical objections to rule 13e-2 are numerous and reflect a wide
disparity of opinion held by the securities bar and by brokers concerning
the proper scope of rule 13e-2."' One critic has suggested that the rule
should apply not only to issuers, issuers' affiliates, and controlling
stockholders, but also to substantial individual stockholders. 2 Wealthy
individual stockholders could raid the corporation's stock and sell it to
another corporation, while the founding and controlling shareholders are
restricted by rule 13e-2 from preventing the raid." Imposing the same
restrictions on both parties would prevent these raids."' Although the
scenario above is possible, the problem is clearly outside the scope of the
rule. These wealthy individual stockholders are not in control of the
issuer and are not able to manipulate the price of the stock to the detri-
ment of investors, and the prevention of manipulation by those in control
is the purpose of rule 13e-2." In contrast, another critic has argued that
some issuer repurchases by affiliates should be excluded from rule
13e-2." Purchases of small amounts of securities or those made without
any deceptive intent should be excluded from the rule because the rule
would unduly restrict an affiliate's activities that are unlikely to be
manipulative." While an intent requirement would undermine easy en-
the current proposed rule 13e-2. See Proposed Rule, supra note 16, at K-5; note 16 supra.
Congress thus passed § 13(e) aware that the SEC would use that rule-making authority to
regulate substantively issuer repurchases. See Proposed Rule, supra note 16, at K-5.
Moreover, a Senate committee has observed that issuer repurchases have both legitimate
purposes that must be encouraged and potential abuses that must be prevented. S. REP. No.
550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. at 5 (1967).
11 Since the early 1970's, the Supreme Court has shifted from pro-plaintiff to pro-
defendant in civil actions. See 4 A. BROMBERO, SECURITIEs LAw FRAUD, § 2.4, at 384.1-84.2
(1975).
70 See Commercial Capital Corp. v. SEC, 360 F.2d 856, 858 (7th Cir. 1966).
" The investment firm of Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith Inc. favors the adop-
tion of rule 13e-2, but another investment firm, American Financial Enterprise, Inc. opposes
the rule. See Letter from American Financial Enterprises, Inc. to SEC (January 15, 1981)
(SEC File No. S7-858); Letter from Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith Inc. to SEC
(January 13, 1981) (SEC File No. S7-858). Law firms also differ on the adoption of the rule.
Compare Letter from Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker to SEC (January 15, 1981) (SEC
File No. S7-858) (strong objection to rule) with Letter from Walsh, Case, Coale, Brown &
Burke to SEC (October 31, 1980) (SEC File No. S7-858) (need for rule questionable but
recommends expansion of persons subject to rule).
72 Letter from Walsh, Case, Coale, Brown & Burke to SEC (October 31, 1980) (SEC File
No. S7-858). Mr. Case recommends that rule 13e-2 apply to individual stockholders who own
10% or more of a corporation's shares. Id.
73 Id.
74 Id.
11 See Proposed Rule, supra note 16, at K-1 & 2; text accompanying notes 17-34 supra.
" Letter from Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith Inc. to SEC (January 13, 1981)
(SEC File No. S7-858).
77 Id.
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forcement of the rule, the scope of the rule should be limited to pur-
chases and corporations of a significant size so that the opportunity for
manipulative abuse is not inconsequential." The SEC has previously
limited some of its rule-making to corporations or purchases of a certain
size, and a continuation of that policy is appropriate for rule 13e-2. 8
Although the purchase limitations of rule 13e-2 are quite controver-
sial, the securities bar also disagrees on the necessity of disclosure re-
quirements in rule 13e-2. Some critics argue that the disclosure re-
quirements of the rule are unnecessary because they repeat those found
in other provisions of the '34 Act. 0 Other critics argue that the rule
needs more specific disclosure procedures,8' and suggest that the
disclosure procedures include a requirement for a press release and
direct notification to shareholders rather than require no specific form of
disclosure.82 The SEC designed rule 13e-2 to provide explicit guidance to
issuers, and since courts have indicated that issuers should sustain a
heavy burden of disclosure,83 specific disclosure requirements may be ap-
propriate for rule 13e-2.
Although many technical objections to proposed rule 13e-2 exist, the
SEC should adopt the rule. The rule reasonably promotes the SEC's
aims to facilitate legitimate issuer repurchases and to prevent undue
issuer control in the securities market. 4 Moreover, despite its technical
inadequacies, the rule is needed to provide accurate and efficient
guidance to issuers planning to repurchase some of their own
securities." Further revision of proposed rule 13e-2 is unnecessary
because whatever benefit to be had from revision must surely have been
gleaned in rule 13e-2's three prior revisions.88 In its present form, pro-
posed rule 13e-2 preserves the balance between investors and market
forces that Congress sought to achieve in the Williams Act. 7 The rule
78 The SEC has expressly avoided determining that all of the prohibited transactions
are indeed manipulative. See Proposed Rule, supra note 16, at K-2. The SEC has chosen to
rely on its § 13(e) authority "to define means reasonable designed to prevent ...
manipulative acts," so that, on balance, abusive conduct is prohibited. Id.
" See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-263 (1980) (less extensive registration requirements
for small businesses); 17 C.F.R. § 240.15b10-7 (registration exemption for brokers with in-
comes under $1000).
' See Letter from American Financial Enterprises, Inc. to SEC (January 15, 1981)
(SEC File No. S7-858).
" See Letter from Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith Inc. to SEC (January 13,
1981) (SEC File No. S7-858).
8, Id.; see text accompanying notes 32-34 supra.
See Proposed Rule, supra note 16, at K-2; note 6 supra.
See Proposed Rule, supra note 16, at K-1.
See text accompanying notes 51-63 supra.
See note 16 supra.
See H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. II, reprinted in (1968) U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 2811, 2811-13. Congress sought to balance the need for protection of investors
with the promotion of the smooth operation of the marketplace.
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protects investors by limiting an issuer's excessive influence on the
market and protects the market by eliminating the risk of an issuer's in-
advertent noncompliance.88
LIZANNE THOMAS
See text accompanying notes 25-34, 51-63 supra.
